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Prdcis: Confronted by news of the wars, we in the developed world,
especially in the United States, understand international relations
in light of the distinction between civilized and barbarian. That
understanding makes us willing to intervene militarily, that is, to
engage in barbarism ourselves. We will articulate our engagement
with what we regard as the periphery of civilization in legal terms.
But what law do we wish to give our capability for violence?
I. UNDERSTANDING, VIOLENCE, AND MORAL POLITICS
Again we have ordered our military to intervene, this
time with bombs, cruise missiles, and even helicopters in
Yugoslavia, in an effort to prevent slaughter in the province
of Kosovo. Such interventions appear to be growing
commonplace; I started this Essay a few years and several
conflicts back. But the question has remained the same: how
should we Americans begin to think about using our capacity
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It is a hard question, particularly hard these days. With
the end of the Cold War, the conceptual structure with which
we understood much of international relations, the East-West
order, collapsed. For years, we acted, and we justified our
actions as necessary to protect our way of life against the
threat from the East. Much of our international conduct was
defined by our conception of ourselves as a people that lived
in military opposition, or as it was often called, eternal
vigilance.! The collapse of the East-West order has thus
required a global rethinking of our foreign policy: if we cannot
judge international politics by reference to Eastern danger,
how do we know what conduct, in particular, what
deployment of our military, is appropriate? The answer, at
least in the democratic terms to which this nation aspires, is
that we do not know. No articulate and publicly validated
vision of our role in the new world has yet appeared. Bereft of
the grammar in which it was conceived, the military policy of
the United States is not so much confused as inchoate.
In the aftermath of the Cold War, the theory class held a
plethora of conferences and symposia and wrote stacks of
books and papers. The new state of world affairs was
characterized as a "new world order,"3 "a multipolar world,'"
"a Grotian moment,"' "a uni-multipolar system,"' and so
forth. In spite of these efforts, it is not yet clear how to
articulate the politics that we have experienced since the
collapse of the East-West order. While there is consensus that
the world has changed profoundly, none of the myriad
grammars newly proposed for international relations enjoys
1. "Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty." JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR
QUOTATIONS 479 n.2 (Emily Morrison Beck ed., 14th ed. 1968) This quote is
attributed to Thomas Jefferson.
2. For a brief review of the current situation -within the military itself, see
John Hillen, Defense's Death Spiral, FOREIGN AFF., July/August 1999, at 2, 4.
"[T]he services are in denial about post-Cold War interventions." Id. at 4.
3. No doubt the most significant use of the phrase "new world order" was
that by President George Bush. Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on
the Cessation of the Persian Gulf Conflict 27 WKLY. COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 259
(1991).
4. See, e.g., Ambassador L. Paul Bremmer, Geopolitical Risk Assessment in
Times of Turmoil, 4 TULSA J. CONT'. & INTL L. 117, 119 (1996).
5. Samuel K. Murumba, Grappling with a Grotian Moment: Sovereignty and
the Quest for a Normative World Order, 19 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 829 (1993).
6. Samuel Huntington, The Lonely Superpower, FOREIGN AFF., March/April




Events, sadly, do not always wait for theory. As ever, we
find ourselves involved in violent drama, but now we no
longer claim to understand our role in our various theaters of
operation. While we often have practical consensus-at least
within the Beltway-we have little conceptual apparatus
with which to judge our actions. Yet all too often we must
either commit or condone violence. The collapse of the East-
West order thus presents the United States with the moral
danger of engaging in thoughtless violence.
I conceived and began writing this Essay as an effort at
political prescription, as a preliminary step toward a
jurisprudence of warfare. As law professors often do, I began
by addressing an idealized democratic audience, comprised of
reflective participants in the polity. My hope was to foster
more self-conscious and responsible, and hence morally
defensible, foreign policy.
I confess that I have become somewhat skeptical of this
enterprise. Aside from its presumption that argument,
specifically my argument, matters so much, how American of
me to have expected that politics be morally satisfying, that
Washington be the city upon the hill,7 despite the fact that it
is quite literally built upon a swamp. I have come to think we
may be condemned to episodic violence, publicly justified
after the fact. As a practical matter, perhaps we must trust
our policy elites, i.e., the internal discourse of the foreign
policy community, coupled with somewhat more public
interventions in the pages of The New York Times and
similarly influential venues, may be the best that we can
expect by way of democratic discourse. Such government by
bureaucracy might not be so terrible-more public involvement
with our decisions to go to war might simply increase the
7. Jesus said: "You are the light of the world. A city that is set on a hill
cannot be hid." Matthew 5:14 (King James). John Winthrop, the founder and
first governor of the Massachusetts Bay Colony, made the image central to the
American political imagination:
For we must Consider that we shall be as a City upon a Hill, the eyes
of all people are upon us; so that if we shall deal falsely with our God in
this work we have undertaken and so cause him to withdraw his
present help from us, we shall be made a story and a by-word through
the world.
John Winthrop, A Model of Christian Charity, in 2 WINTRMOP PAPERS 282, 295
(Stewart Mitchell ed., 1931) (1630); see also John Witte, Jr., How to Govern a
City on a Hill: The Early Puritan Contribution to American Constitutionalism,
39 EMoRY L.J. 41 (1990).
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amount of hand-wringing, without improving the substance
of our policies much. But even if such doubts are true,
thoughtful Americans may desire an explanation, an apology,
for our wars.
Whether read as prescription or apology, this Essay
confronts the present situation with three interrelated
arguments. The first argument is that political thinking,
prescription, need not wait for the completion of analytic
description. For all the variety among individual analyses,
contemporary notions of security and depictions of
international relations share a great deal. As the East-West
order was organized around the division between
communism and capitalism, our ideas of international affairs
are organized around the distinction, often hushed, between
civilization and barbarism. I argue that this distinction will
inform our "defense" policy, much as the Cold War was
informed by realist theories of national interest in an
ideologically polarized world. The sooner we acknowledge
what, in broad outline, we have already decided about our
world, the sooner we can do some hard thinking about
important questions. For example, under what circumstances
are we willing to invade another country, kill a certain
number of its citizenry, and have a certain number of our
own citizens killed in an effort to establish order?
My second argument is that the old ideas of national
interest, international law, diplomacy, and the use of force
have been fundamentally transformed in our time. As a
result, the concepts no longer relate to one another in the
same way they long did. In particular, international law is no
longer defined in opposition to force. Contemporary
international law not only legitimates, but has begun to
articulate, and may even come to require, the use of force
against those the international community deems
barbarians. In a world where military sanctions are used to
achieve compliance with United Nations resolutions and
where war crimes tribunals are almost routinely declared as
soon as the butchery stops, war has been, literally, legalized.
International law is now, if as yet only intermittently,
enforceable, and the hoary criticism of international law, that
it is not law because it has no enforcement mechanism, has
been answered on its own terms. Recognizing that war has
been legalized begs the question: what law do we give our
wars?
My third argument is that this question is difficult to ask
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and vital to answer. A thoughtful answer requires an
intellectual perspective from which one could discriminate
among proposed interventions, could distingish between
good, problematic, and bad exercises of force. As the rather
random and episodic nature of our recent military adventures
demonstrates, we currently have little by way of such
perspective, and so are left to respond to the claim that the
national interest is what our national government,
emboldened by polls and a favorable market for securities,
says it is. And the government tends to say the national
interest is sufficient to justify the military action proposed by
the government. At the moment, our political discourse is
strikingly free from voices that are both taken seriously and
more than superficially critical of this logic.
The collapse of the East-West order was important for
Americans in part because it entailed a collapse of the
intellectual apparatus that traditionally had been used to
criticize, and so ultimately vet, the power of the developed
countries, particularly the United States. The left was
discredited, or transformed from a critical perspective into
generalized affection for the downtrodden, or became an
aesthetic stance (pomo multiculturalism), or simply lost
heart-however one characterizes recent intellectual history,
the left has ceased to fulfill its traditional role of trenchant
opposition to current policy initiatives, including military
interventions. As I have already suggested, the absence of
such criticism, a world without the resistance of thought,
poses a moral danger to the forceful. At the core of my third
argument is a preliminary effort toward providing a
grammar through which political criticism could be made.
To recapitulate: the first argument holds that we have
already made a sharp distinction between civilized and
barbarian, and that distinction inclines us to military
intervention. The second argument maintains that war has
become an element of international law and is no longer an
object of international law. The third argument suggests
ways we may begin to think about our capability for violence.
Taken together, the three arguments raise constitutive
8. This Essay relies throughout on a distinction between force, and its
dramatic expression, violence, on the one hand, and power on the other. See
HANNAH ARENDT, On Violence, in CRISES OF THE REPUBLIC, at 103, 143-44 (1972).
To simplify: power is political, while force is instrumental; power requires
assent, while force does not.
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questions about the appropriate substance of the new law
through war.
I draw no firm conclusions, and confess to uncertainty
regarding what the substance of our military policy should
be. It is unclear to me when military force should be used to
stop what we view as barbaric conduct. Yet I doubt that it is
more noble to refrain from violence in the face of barbarism
than to create some semblance of order, that it is better to
claim a convenient relativism while thousands, even millions,
die in far-off lands. This Essay is an effort to think seriously
and candidly about the imperial implications of such
thoughts.
IL CIVILIZATION AND BARBARISM
For the sake of convenience, and at the price of
considerable simplification, I collectively call "realist" the
thinking about international relations that was informed by
the East-West order. "Realism" has meant a lot of things, so a
bit of clarification may be useful. America persists in seeing
itself as pragmatic (notwithstanding considerable evidence to
the contrary), and "idealist" has often been a term of
dismissal. As a result, various foreign policies have often
been labeled realist by their supporters. Yet despite the
ubiquity of the term, realism also has meant something for
American foreign policy in the 20th century: the belief that
individual nations could be understood in terms of their
particular interests, and that foreign policy was the art and
science of satisfying those interests through diplomacy,
alliance, economic promise or pressure, threats, and when
necessary, war. This, of course, is nothing more or less than
the continuation of the 19th century European tradition of
Realpolitik-and this is how Henry Kissinger, perhaps the
greatest foreign policy realist in twentieth century American
politics, uses the word.9
9. Whether Kissinger should be considered a realist is debatable. The
substance of Kissinger's arguments, in particular, the extensive use of the
concept of honor in his discussion of Vietnam-as distinct from Kissinger's
characterizations of his own arguments-may be understood as, in its way,
idealistic. See Philip Zelikow, The Statesman in Winter. Kissinger on the Ford
Years, FOREIGN AFF., May/June 1999, at 123, 124-26 (reviewing HENRY
KISSINGER, YEARS OF RENEWAL (1999)). Conversely, the claim that the Nixon or
Ford Administrations had, or could have had, in mind the clear and
uncontestable interests in the sense Realism seems to require seems impossible
[Vol. 48304
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Even though realism is older than the Cold War, the
East-West order was primarily an ordering, and hence a
clarification, not of history (then, as now, mysterious), but of
national interests. To simplify, the national interest in
surviving the Cold War transformed the amorphous set of
vague aspirations and uncertain possibilities for more or less
dubious political entities into well-defined interests held as a
matter of knowable fact by nations whose identities were
beyond question. In a world polarized between adversaries
armed with nuclear weapons, there could be argument over
tactics and even some commitments, but little over ultimate
ends. Because the existence and much of the substance of the
national interest was not really open for question during the
Cold War, some form of realism was the only game in town
for anybody in a position of responsibility. So even President
Kennedy, who is often if perhaps erroneously remembered as
an idealist (a question beyond the scope of even this Essay),
supported the overthrow of the government of Cuba,
increased U.S. involvement in Vietnam, and faced down the
Soviet Union in Berlin-all in the name of defending U.S.
interests. It is true that the death toll in Vietnam eventually
made the fundamentally bizarre nature of that war only too
apparent, so that some people did say better red than dead,
but few opponents of the Vietnam War seriously argued for
capitulation to the Soviet Union or China. The serious (and
correct, as it turned out) argument was that South Vietnam
was not vital to U.S. security, and hence not worth the costs
of the war.' In short, the Cold War's simplification of
interests made realist thinking about politics almost
inevitable."
to maintain.
10. Simply put, "we were wrong, terribly wrong." ROBERT S. MCNAMARA, IN
RETROSPECT: THE TRAGEDY AND LESSONS OF VIETNAM at xvi (1995).
11. There was, of course, another tradition, international legalism. See
generally MARTrI KOsKENmI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA (1989). Three points
should be made for present purposes. First, as a general matter, legalists did
not argue that interests were unimportant, but instead argued that legality was
in the long term interests of the United States. Second, during much of this
period, the realists seemed to have the better of the argument, in government
and perhaps even in the academy. Third, the legalists themselves can be
understood as a construct of the Realists. See, e.g., Kissinger's use of
"Wilsonian" in framing the problem of d6tente: "But an attempt to balance
rewards and penalties inseparable from consensus-building ran counter to the
prevailing Wilsonianism, which tried to bring about a global moral order
through the direct application of America's political values undiluted by
2000] 305
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The East-West order shaped realist thinking about the
use of force in two powerful ways. First, it facilitated a radical
separation of strategic thought from political thought.
Second, the East-West order inclined people to think of
political events in terms of space rather than of time. The
collapse of the East-West order made realism, at least
realism as we knew it, no longer a sensible mode of
understanding international politics. More specifically, the
dissolution of the East-West order integrated strategy and
politics, and gave rise to a host of diachronic, that is
historical, approaches to international relations. Both the
integration of strategy and politics and the emergent
historical conceptions of international relations entail a sharp
distinction between orderly and disorderly politics, between
civilization and barbarism.
A. Strategy
The image of the "balance" of power has been used to
describe politics for centuries, but never more aptly than
during the Cold War. The balance of power so perfectly
described the polarity of the Cold War that it became integral
to, indeed practically synonymous with, the concept of the
East-West order. Although the image was so familiar as to be
almost transparent, a great deal of political presumption was
locked within its crystalline structure. East and West existed,
and there was a "balance" between them that presumably
somehow "weighed" a quality called power, possessed by the
enemies, each side, in the way material objects possess mass.
This enemy, real enough, but also postulated by the balance
of power-without an enemy, what would be balanced?-served
to solidify political alliance, and hence political identity, on
both sides. Throughout the Cold War, divisions among states
party to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or
the Warsaw Pact, as well as divisions within each state, were
obscured by the need to maintain a common front against the
enemy.
In the context of the balance of power, the discipline of
strategic studies turned on a single inquiry: to what extent
did an event, either actual or possible, enlarge the military
potential of one side or the other? This inquiry often raised
nice issues of judgment. For example, both the United States
compromises with 'realism.'" KISSINGER, supra note 9, at 93.
[Vol. 48306
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and the Soviet Union long maintained inefficient capacity for
the manufacture of steel in order to serve anticipated
wartime needs. Within the contours of the strategic
argument, the precise relationship between the capacity to
manufacture steel and military fitness was debatable, but the
stakes and the terms of the argument were clear. Equally
clear was what was not at issue in the security debate, viz.
broader questions of political conduct. Political questions,
such as how to pay for the subsidy, were not unrelated, but
were considered analytically separable inquiries. Just as
participants in a sport rarely consider the appropriateness of
the rules that inform their game, the balance of power so well
defined strategic questions that larger questions went
unasked.
Today, strategic studies is a far trickier business. The
East-West order, which defined both the actors and the
objectives, no longer exists. In the words of Polish politician
Bronislaw Geremek, we are confronted by dangers, not
enemies. 2 There is no balance of power with danger, no
conflict with danger. Danger may be assessed. But without a
hard-edged notion of conflict to provide a context in which
probability can be calculated, danger assessment is a hazy
enterprise. Suppose, for plausible example, that the
European Union is somehow at risk from unrest in Southern
Europe. Should the Union attempt to integrate its forces to
defend itself against Southern Europe? Should a new wall be
built? Or should the Union attempt to integrate Southern
Europe into its defense structure, either through NATO or
the Western European Union, in the hopes of minimizing the
risk of violent disorder? How much of Europe (what is
Europe?) should be included in this process of integration?
Should this process be limited to the military sector, or
should it include the economy? How complete, and how swift,
is this effort to be? And so forth.
Strategy that would confront such threats requires a
view of politics considerably more nuanced than polarity;
policy cannot be determined by argument that one "side"
enjoys some military advantage over the other. Strategic
thinking now entails politics, economics, and history, in
addition to its traditional focus on military capability,
12. Bronislaw Geremek, Keynote Address for the Conference 'The
International System after the Collapse of the East-West Order," Institute for
European and International Studies, Luxembourg, Feb. 1, 1993 (author's notes).
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because a strategic world where security is threatened by
dangers rather than enemies is complex and vague in ways
that the old strategic world was not.3 In response to
uncertainty, the new strategic thinking seeks stability more
avidly than it seeks some ill-defined "advantage." Stability is
hardly a new concern; what is new is that stability has
become virtually the only concern. So, for example, it recently
appeared to make strategic sense to cut the size of our
military, in part because the federal deficit was thought to
hamper national competitiveness and economic unrest was
seen as a greater threat to our security than invasion.
Similarly, it makes strategic sense for Western European
states to give money to help the young governments of
Central and Southern Europe stabilize their economies, not
because those governments plan to invade, but because their
failure may lead to massive immigration or civil war. Rather
than the purchase of military hardware, security concerns
now impel the provision of loan guarantees. Strategy used to
mean the attainment of military superiority, or at least
deterrence; it now means the pursuit of social stability.
Politics writ large has absorbed strategic studies.
The vague character of threats to social security means
that when we cannot quarantine social instability (as we
frequently do with those chaotic Africans), intervention is
likely. In a dangerous world, security is obtained by proactive
measures designed to shore up the social order. In contrast,
in the traditional world of enemies, security is the capability
to respond to the threat posed by the enemy. (Only rarely has
security been thought best obtained by preemptive attack.)
So we long preserved the capacity to respond to Soviet
aggression with nuclear force, if necessary. The very
language of the cich6 is reactive. Today, the United States is
criticized not for its lack of readiness, but for not taking
enough action within the former Soviet Union to help ensure
that the weapons of mass destruction remain in sane hands.
In this light, the invasion of Panama and the signing of the
North American Free Trade Agreement may be understood
as attempts to establish a viable social order in situations
that present profound threats to our security, our lust for
13. See Emma Rothchild, What is Security? (The Quest for World Order)
DAEDALEUS, June 22, 1995, at 53 (1995), for a similar view of the complexity-
and "verbosity"-of contemporary notions of security, along with a discussion of
the antecedents of current conceptions.
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drugs and the weaknesses peculiar to a highly technological
economy.
If security is now better procured than defended, then
early intervention will often be more effective and cheaper
than late intervention. Contemporary strategic thinking
inclines to the adage "a stitch in time saves nine." Diffuse
threats to security should be addressed before they have time
to gain focus and momentum. The task for contemporary
strategic thinking is therefore the avoidance, rather than the
development, of the logic of war. For example, it is has for
some time been argued that more decisive action by the
European Community (and then the European Union) and
the United Nations at the outbreak of violence in Yugoslavia
might have prevented at least some of the carnage and
associated risks. War, even civil war, has its own awful logic,
and the various factions in what was Yugoslavia fought
within that logic, to regain territory lost by military action, to
avenge loved ones, and so bloody on, in the gyre of public and
private violence bemoaned since the Oresteia.4 Had the logic
of violence not been established, Yugoslavia might be merely
politically fractious, like Belgium or even what was
Czechoslovakia. The transformation of strategy amounts to
an imperative to intervene, militarily if necessary, in the
service of order.
B. International Relations: Progress Theories and Culture
Theories
If the first powerful way the East-West order shaped
realist thinking was to encourage an analytic separation
between strategic and political thought, the second way the
East-West order shaped realist thinking about international
relations was to privilege space over time. Realist theories
presented politics in terms of position: East and West were
both enemies and directions in space. International events
were understood to "tip the balance" in favor of one "side" or
the other. The balance was more or less weighted from time
to time, more during the Cuban missile crisis, less during
14. And yet such conflicts are new each time, a reality perhaps mirrored by
the perpetual task of translation. Compare the masterfully literate translations
of Richmond Lattimore in 2 THE COMPLETE GREEK TRAGEDIES (David Greene &
Richmond Lattimore trans., 1959) with the more theatrical translations of his
colleagues at Chicago in THE OREsTEIA BY AESCHYLUS: A NEW TRANSLATION FOR
THE THEATER (David Grene & Wendy Doniger O'Flaherty trans., 1989).
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d6tente, but the balance, conflict, was always there, and each
event was analyzed within its a priori and essentially
atemporal structure. For the political analysts of several
generations, all the imagery was spatial.
Time simply did not figure in realist political calculus.
Realist theories spent little effort on the genetic questions of
politics, like the causes of conflict and the sources of identity,
because conflict and identity were presumed by the imagery
of the balance of power. Safe from historical questions, realist
theories were able to rest upon confident assertions
regarding, inter alia, the relative stability of nations, the
objective character of power, and the monolithic quality of
national interests. Realist theories tended to mistake a
spatial description of a particular political situation, the
conflict between East and West, for the essence of
international politics. The realist paradigm, despite the
claims of its adherents to tough-minded fidelity to fact and
hard-nosed pragmatism, was not just a description of the
politics informed by the Cold War, but an intellectual
expression of those same politics. This goes far to explain the
oft-remarked failure of the political sciences to predict
virtually any of the surprising events round about 1989.
Realist political thought could not envision, much less
articulate, the end of the Cold War because that would have
required abandoning the working assumptions that defined
and made possible realist thought. The realist paradigm was
swept aside, not by superior argument, but by a host of
events that completely escaped the political imagery which
the realists had at their disposal.
A surfeit of new models of international relations have
been offered in the last few years. The realist theories were
spatial, synchronic. Unsurprisingly, the majority of new
accounts are temporal, diachronic, that is, they locate
international affairs within historical time rather than
within the space of global conflict. Consonantly, the new
diachronic theories focus on genetic questions ignored by
realist theories. Virtually all contemporary theories of
international relations can be grouped under one of two
headings, "progress" and "culture."5
15. For a similar approach to recent literature, see the recent Economist
survey The Road to 2050: A Survey of the New Geopolitics, THE ECONOMIST, July
31, 1999, at 46:
The best way to start the search for the right map [of the planet in fifty
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1. Progress Theories. Progress theories are creations of
the economically minded. Their general argument is that
economic liberalism is the essential condition for, indeed the
guarantor of, material progress. Liberalism requires a system
of contract and property rights, reasonably stable
institutions, freedom of communication and research (some
say including the institutionalization of scientific and
technological research), and the other elements of a modern
market. The societies that adopt these cultural prerequisites
are able to harness human ingenuity and to progress.
Material progress, the unfolding of human mastery over the
circumstances of life, is universally attractive, and is the
motive force behind the emergence of a global modern
culture. Modernism is the establishment of a continually
progressive society, i.e. a society in which the change and
innovation of the marketplace is used to transform the
marketplace itself, or, phrased cybernetically, in which the
growth of information and the ability to handle that
information contribute to new methods for processing data.
Progress theories further maintain that although
modernity's technological products are universally attractive,
modernity itself is a culturally located phenomenon.
Modernity does not occur in most cultures at most times, but
requires the adoption of economic liberalism, i.e. the social
conditions once locally associated with Western Europe and
North America. States such as the erstwhile Soviet Union
ignore the prerequisites of modernity at their peril. Without
adopting economic liberalism, such states can neither
produce militarily adequate technology nor satisfy the ever-
increasing material desires of their people, and will
eventually collapse. Unprogressive societies fail; progressive
societies triumph. Progress theorists tend to see the collapse
years] is by examining the two chief theories of radical change: the
optimist rationalist view that states are getting more and more like
each other, and so have no need to fight one another; and the bleak
blood-and-guts retort that they are still divided by one vital and
probably irreconcilable difference.
Id. at 4. What I call progress theorists, The Economist labeled rational
optimists, exemplified by Francis Fukuyama. See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END
OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992); The End of History? THE NATIONAL
INTEREST, Summer 1989, at 3. The Economist takes Samuel Huntington to be
the paladin of those I discuss under the heading "culture theorists." See SAMUEL
HUNTINGTON, The CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER
(1996); The Clash of Civilizations? FOREIGN AFF., Summer 1993, at 22 (1993);
supra note 6, at 35.
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of the Soviet Union as vindication of their theory of history.
While the precise relationship between economic and
political liberalism remains controversial among progress
theorists, progress theories all argue for the political and
social stability required by the market. Radical redistribution
(inflationary practices, nationalization of assets, excessive
taxation, etc.) hinders, or even prevents, the ftnctioning of
the market, and so slows, or even precludes, the sweeping
social changes wrought by market-driven innovation.
Progress theories thus argue for political and institutional
stability in the interest of positive material change. Although
controversy exists regarding the political liberality
appropriate to developing economies, considerable agreement
exists that the most effective guarantee of the stability
required by established market societies is government by
consent of the governed, political liberalism. Stated
negatively, authoritarian systems present enormous
temptations to their ruling elites to engage in economically
ruinous practices. In the long view, progress theories
generally hold that the economics of modernity requires
political liberalism.
Progress theories regard armed conflict as archaic. Kant
was the first to argue, in his essay Toward Perpetual Peace,
that liberal states do not go to war with one another.6 The
rise of the European Union is taken to be the premier
instantiation of the claim that military violence among truly
modern societies is improbable. Western Europe, that
spawning ground of global war, has been pacified by the
creation of a unified European market. Peace, however
realized, is generally considered a good thing, and so progress
theories use conflict to reinforce their general political
prescription: good politics is the establishment of sound
markets.
Progress theories usually imply that global order is
likely, perhaps inevitable. If, on the one hand, modern
societies (governed by states like the United States or Japan)
triumph, and on the other hand, both unmodern societies
(ruled by states like the Soviet Union) and premodern
societies (in which states often do not adopt the economic
liberalism mandated by the International Monetary Fund)
fail, then sooner or later all states will be progressive.
16. IMMANUEL KANT, To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, in
PERPETURAL PEACE AND OTHER ESSAYS 107 (Ted Humphrey trans., 1983) (1795).
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Modernity will be universal. (Progress theorists are
sometimes derided as "One Worlders.") Progress theorists
usually regard the emergence of a global consumer culture
with satisfaction, and tend to look forward to the
universalization of modernity as a clear improvement in the
human condition. After all, in the global market, more and
more people will have access to the things they want, and so,
presumably, will be more happy. At the same time,
participation in the global order eliminates the substantial
differences among groups that causes wars.
The progressive utopia is the global market; progress
theories are ultimately theories of order. But in our world,
even progress theorists must admit that conflict abounds.
While predicting the eventual construction of a modern world
order, progress theorists acknowledge the reality of conflict
by presenting the contemporary world as bifurcated between
those who participate in the emerging global market culture,
and those who do not. The core, the modem world of trade, is
stable, non-violent, efficient. The periphery, the not-yet-
modem world, is unstable, violent, messy. The discussion of
progress theories thus replicates the discussion of strategy:
the world is divided into modern and primitive zones, into the
world capable of progress and the world incapable of
progress, into order and disorder.
2. Culture Theories. While the collapse of command
economies occasions progress theories, culture theories
attend to a variety of contemporary political phenomena,
such as the rise of new nations, the resurgence of
fundamentalist religious movements, and the reemergence
of ethnic hatreds and local identities. Culture theories
maintain that the East-West order temporarily obscured
more durable and fundamental species of political life. No
longer shadowed by the East-West order, these forms of
political life now flourish.
Culture theories emphasize the nuances of particular
cultures. There is no unified language of culture theories
comparable to the ideology of liberalism in which progress
theories are phrased. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism is
discussed in terms different from those used for Japanese
labor practices and different yet again from the language
used to discuss African nationalisms. The first inquiry might
be couched in religious language, the second in the jargon of
sociology, the third in the language of colonial and tribal
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history and development economics. But all culture theories
ultimately rest on some notion of identity-Muslim, keiretsu,
Ugandan-which can be politically mobilized. If progress
theories are the creation of the economically minded, culture
theories are the creation of scholars we might broadly call
anthropologists, who focus on the unifying differences among
groups, that is, on the relationships between individual
identity and politics.
The proper relationship between individual identity and
political form has long been phrased as a moral imperative,
the self-determination of peoples. During the Cold War, the
Wilsonian ideal of self-determination was a virtue often
honored in the breach, in Vietnam, in Hungary, and
elsewhere. The subordination of the "will of the people" to the
practical requirements of security obscured the difficulties
inherent in the ideal of self-determination. Perhaps because
it was so rarely practiced, the ideal of self-determination
remained vibrant throughout the Cold War, and upon the
dissolution of the East-West order, peoples began clamoring
for home rule.
The resultant disintegration and proliferation of states
has made the very concept of the state-once the basis of
international relations, questioned only as an academic
exercise-seem as analytically dubious as it is politically
popular. States, it appears in much of the world, are fragile
entities that cannot serve to structure our thinking about
large scale politics. Culture theories therefore turn from
states to cultures in an attempt to understand the essence of
politics, to define the substrata on which political institutions
are founded. If the cultural foundations of politics could be
secured, then perhaps we could build sound institutions. We
could appropriately relate states to peoples, as opposed to
drawing futile lines on a map, as was done in Africa, Central
and Eastern Europe, and the Middle East. The epidemic of
civil wars with which we are now confronted, as peoples
struggle to define both themselves and so their borders,
would thereby be averted. The Wilsonian dream of self-
determination would be realized; institutional form would
reflect psychological, and hence societal, reality.
The quest has proven confusing rather than fruitless.
There are a great many names for the political essence, the
object of the quest: identity, community, culture, interest,
solidarity, collective subconscious, and so forth. Like a river,
that affinity for our fellows prior to and required by the
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institutions of ordinary politics has many sources. Attempts
to ground political identity in some set of reasonably objective
criteria (common candidates are language, religion, shared
history, economic interest or class, race, and gender) have
failed. The essence of political identity, the one true well-
spring of politics presumed by culture theories, has proven
ephemeral. Political identity can apparently be formed
around any or all of these aspects of life in groups, and no
doubt others as well. A general culture theory appears
unlikely.
We are thus left with the work of comparativists who
attempt to explain relatively local politics, not in terms of a
grand theory, but in terms of a specific society. In this self-
conscious insistence on particularity, culture theories differ
from both progress theories and from realist theories of order,
each of which aspires to organize the planet within a single
conceptual framework. If progress theories culminate in a
vision of one world, an empire of sorts, culture theories aspire
to many worlds, each peaceably going about its own business,
like islands in an archipelago.
Culture theories are like realist theories, and unlike
progress theories, in that culture theories are preoccupied
with conflict. Progress theories concentrate on the market
order, where conflict is highly localized, primarily as
nonviolent economic competition. Outside the market order,
warfare exists, but this will be subdued as primitive societies
are modernized. Culture theories, in contrast, often stress
that different cultures have incompatible beliefs, and that
those beliefs may be essential to the culture. For culture
theories, conflict, at least conceptual, is both inevitable and
perennial. Violent conflict is certainly possible, and it is the
widespread outbreak of cultural violence, for example in
Algeria, Azerbaijan, and Guatemala, that gives culture
theories their urgency.
By insisting on the perennial character of inter-cultural
conflict, culture theories spawn prescriptions for cultural
coexistence, efforts to establish a language and custom for the
archipelago. Politically, culture theories require a certain
minimum order, a general respect for the territory and affairs
of other cultures, and a universal hesitancy to interfere. The
modus vivendi proposed by culture theories for relations
among various cultures resembles the practice of the United
Nations: a set of formally neutral procedures, which allows
each a voice and avoids coercing any. In so doing, culture
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theories tend to require, if only sub rosa, that a certain
minimum standard of behavior be met. One cannot deal with
people one believes to be utter savages. Through their
analytical emphasis on conflict, culture theories prescribe a
liberal political order for intercultural relations.
Culture theories incline their adherents to liberalism, at
least among cultures, just as powerfully as do progress
theories. Suppose a culture ignores the minimal order and
coerces another culture; suppose the Sudan, Indonesia, or
Tibet. The challenge presented by those who flatly ignore
cultural pluralism is, at least intellectually, a challenge to the
existence of every other culture. Those interested in
preserving their own way of life have a powerful interest in
curbing the hegemonic efforts of others, lest interference
become acceptable. The pluralistic world order can survive
only if all are pluralists, whether by choice or perforce.
Culture theories thus see conflict against a backdrop of order,
the minimal standards of conduct which the world needs to
get by. Phrased more pointedly, the analysis and defense of
cultural pluralism ironically requires universal participation
in the liberal civil society among cultures.
While they provide very different analyses of
international affairs, the strategic implications of culture and
progress theories are practically indistinguishable. From the
perspective of culture theories, the international liberal order
is a political accommodation of a conflicted world; from the
perspective of progress theories, the international liberal
order is the result of the forward march of modernity.
Culture theories begin by focussing on conflict and
particularity, and are forced to call for a minimal but
universal standard of order. Progress theories begin with an
abstract vision of universal order and are forced to
acknowledge the prevalence of conflict, at least at the
margins of the civilized states which are of superior interest.
Both sorts of theory are inclined to liberalism among civilized
states, and see conflict against a backdrop, even if only
imagined, of universal order. The structural oppositions
implicit in the strategies of both sorts of theory are identical:
order/disorder; peaceful/violent; civilized/barbarian;
liberal/illiberal.
Contemporary analyses of international relations thus
recapitulate, in somewhat more general fashion, the concerns
of contemporary strategic thinking. The world is a dangerous
place. Violent disorder lurks. Good politics, then, is the effort
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to strengthen the frontiers of the civilized world, and when
possible, to tame the wilderness. Circle the wagons. We move
at dawn.
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WAR
A. Enforcing International Law
The end of the Gulf War gave United Nations personnel
the right to inspect and dismantle the Iraqi program for the
construction of weapons of mass destruction. Shortly after
the war, however, Iraq ceased cooperating with the United
Nations inspectors. Confronted with a recalcitrant Iraq, the
United States and its allies, generally referred to as the
"Coalition," began taking limited military action, for example,
launching cruise missiles at a site alleged to have been used
for the manufacture of weapons-grade fissionable material.
Although technically acts of war, such actions were not
expected to renew hostilities. Nor was it expected that the
cruise missiles would physically destroy Iraq's weapons
program. Instead, cruise missile launches and similar actions
were taken in support of the inspection and sanctions regime
imposed by international law (through U.N. Security Council
resolutions) on Iraq. The United States has continued to use
force in this manner up to the time of this writing. Secretary
of State Madeline Albright said, in 1999, "[W]e are talking
about using military force [against Iraq], but we are not
talking about war. That is an important distinction."'
7
The distinction, while risible, is real: by imposing
military sanctions on Iraq, the Coalition used force not as an
alternative to law (or to diplomacy), but in the service of law.
I believe this relationship between international law and
military force is new. The aftermath of the Gulf War
integrated law and force in much the same way that they are
integrated in domestic legal systems. The violence of police
enforcement is not merely countenanced by municipal law, it
is part and parcel of the criminal justice system. Similarly,
the military sanctions taken by the Coalition against Iraq
were not violent expressions of national interests, legitimate
(or not) under international law-which is why Secretary
17. Lawrence F. Kaplan, How to Send a 'Message. Use AT&T, Not USAF,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 23, 1998, at A14.
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Albright insisted that the military actions taken against Iraq
were not acts of war. Instead, the use of force was actually
occasioned by the need to secure compliance with
international law, specifically, the resolutions of the Security
Council.
From its beginning, international law had been
preoccupied with violence. Traditionally, however,
international law was opposed to violence. Hugo Grotius,
widely known as the father of public international law,
published The Law of War and Peace (De Jure Belli Ac Pacis)
in 1625, which is regarded in the West as the first systematic
treatise of international law. 8 (Islamic law claims several
older works, notably Shaybani's Siyar.)9 Grotius employed
the traditional distinction between the law of war (jus ad
bellum), which governs the border line between peace and
war, and the law in war (jus in bello), which attempts to set
minimal standards for the conduct of warfare. International
law regarding the use of force traditionally either defined and
thereby limited the legal consequences of war, or attempted
to regulate, in some small way, the practice of war itself. In
either endeavor, international law was an ordering of affairs
different from, and opposed to, the use of force, warfare.
This opposition between international law and force
traditionally made international law different from much of
municipal law, e.g. criminal law or, less obviously,
commercial law, in which law is intimately associated with
the coercive power of the state. Indeed, the 19th century
English legal philosopher Austin defined law as the
command of the sovereign, backed by a coercive sanction.
Because international law had no enforcement mechanism,
Austin famously argued, it was not really law at all. °
International law has been opposed to force in different
ways through the twentieth century. At the beginning of the
century, international law aspired to end war, at least among
civilized countries. Carnegie money built the Peace Palace at
the Hague, which now houses the International Court of
Justice. After World War I, these efforts were judged nalve,
and the League of Nations was founded in order to resolve
18. HUGO GROT1US, THE LAW OF WARAND PEACE (Kelsey trans., 1925) (1625).
19. See David A. Westbrook, Islamic International Law and Public
International Law: Separate Expressions of World Order, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 819,
827-33 (1993).
20. JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 106, 152
(David Campbell & Phillip Thomas eds., 1998) (1832).
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international conflicts before they achieved the momentum of
violence. In 1928, most states, including the United States,
signed the General Treaty for the Renunciation of War, often
called the Kellog-Briand Pact. But the League failed to
prevent Italian aggression in Ethiopia, and as the 1930s
declined, it was clear that international law's prohibition of
war had failed.
When the fire was over, the world stood appalled at Nazi
atrocities, and in what had been an age of intellectual
relativism, rediscovered the opposition (so popular during the
nineteenth century) between civilized and uncivilized. The
civilized people of the world had to take some sort of action to
prevent the repetition of such horrors. From San Francisco,
where the United Nations Charter was signed, and from
Nuremberg, where Nazis were tried, it briefly appeared that
the victors would regulate, and in that sense legalize,
warfare.
The creation of the United Nations and the trial of war
criminals introduced the idea of legalized warfare in different
ways. The United Nations introduced the idea directly, by
providing for collective military action in its Charter.
Through the United Nations, the civilized world could
forcibly impose order. Such use of force was different from
earlier forms of collective action, for example the Holy
Alliance formed in response to Napoleon, because the
military might of the United Nations was organized through
the parliamentary processes of an international organization,
rather than by diplomacy among sovereign nations that
happened to share military interests. In the United Nations
Charter, international law first contemplated its own violent
expression.
The Nuremberg trials introduced the idea of legal
warfare in a more subtle way. The trials found the actions of
individuals who prosecuted an aggressive war and a
genocidal campaign to be illegal. Under the traditional law of
war, the actions of nations, not individuals, are illegal, and
the commission of an illegal action gives other nations the
right to respond with force, but does not give rise to the right
to try the citizens of the offending state. At Nuremberg,
however, the actions of individuals were found illegal under
international law. If individual Nazis were guilty of illegal
violence, other participants, for example ordinary soldiers,
were by implication innocent, even though they also violently
prosecuted the same war. To exaggerate: after Nuremberg,
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international law claimed to be able to separate war crimes
from the legal prosecution of an illegal war, barbarian action
from civilized violence within the context of illegality. Making
good on this claim required a nuanced law of war, not simply
the ability to declare when a state of war, as a legal matter,
existed, or even what was prohibited to soldiers.
Traditionally, international law had been simply opposed to
war, and had tried to curb the worst abuses. After
Nuremberg, international law promised to sanction war in
both senses of the word sanction: to punish criminals, and in
so doing, to countenance the legal conduct of collective
violence.
The legalization of warfare announced at San Francisco
and Nuremberg may have been illusory from the start. From
the era of decolonization forth, public international law has
required the assent of many states, representing not only the
developed world, but also the developing world. After World
War II, a few mostly European states could no longer claim,
as they traditionally had, that their shared practice or
consensus constituted international law. Any notion of law
that hinged on a distinction between civilized and
uncivilized-as it now appears any law through war must-
was unlikely to be tolerated by nations which had just won
their independence from colonial rulers and formed states of
their own.
The establishment of a global law of warfare was
prevented in fact, however, by the outbreak of the Cold War
and its strategic, rather than legal, ordering of violence.
Albeit in a dangerous and perverse way, the East-West order
was an order. As such, it suppressed violence (or at the very
least, moved it to the developing world), but this peace was
the result of conflict, of the potential for far more violence, not
the product of law. Hostility was thus ubiquitous, notionally
present even in areas visibly at peace, even in ostensibly
neutral countries. Under the Cold War threat of nuclear
destruction there seemed to be no peaceful space outside the
global conflict from which to judge actions within the conflict.
Military action was interpreted from the perspective of self-
interested parties, and few thought that the details of
military action should be considered under the relative
objectivity of law rather than the frank self-interest of
Realpolitik, even if interests were determined largely by
ideology. The task set by Nuremberg-the distinction
between legal and illegal violence through adjudication-
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proceeded no further. Nor was war legalized through the
legislative function of the United Nations. Stalemates on the
Security Council generally precluded exercise of the collective
use of force provided for in the Charter; rare exceptions such
as the Korean War were widely regarded as manipulation by
the United States rather than examples of collective action.
Finally, scholars poised on the brink of Armageddon
could not seriously support the use of force, and so there was
little support for the legalization-as opposed to the
prevention-of war. Instead, scholars devoted a great deal of
attention to non-violent sanctions. (The paradigmatic
example of such sanctions was the United Nations policy
towards South Africa.) Implicit in the phrase "non-violent
sanctions" was the assumption that non-violence was the
only hope for quasi-coercive persuasion in the international
arena. The United Nations, and by extension international
law, did not have the wherewithal for sustained military
engagement. Peacekeeping forces would generally be
deployed where they were wanted, for example, to oversee an
already agreed upon demobilization of forces, or to prevent
rioting. In such a world, international law and warfare
remained quite separate; warfare remained an object of
international legal discourse, but no more.
To understate, the world has changed. The polarity of the
East-West order has been replaced by the bifurcation
between civilized and barbarian, and warfare, at least some
warfare, has become legalized. These propositions are
instantiated by recent history: armed interventions by
civilized countries, usually but not always under the auspices
of the United Nations, into barbaric situations have been
almost commonplace in the 1990s. Consider military
operations in, for examples, Bosnia, East Timor, Haiti,
Kosovo, Kuwait/Iraq, Rwanda, and Somalia. Civilized
countries also appear quite willing to punish people in
barbaric places who commit atrocities that violate
international law. Consider the war crimes tribunals for
Bosnia, Croatia, and Rwanda, and the efforts to construct a
permanent court of international criminal justice. Law
through war, the formalization of the civilized world's wars
on barbarism, is on its way.
The bifurcation between civilization and barbarism is
evidently far more authoritative in today's international law
than it ever was before. There are a number of reasons for
this. First, nations all over the world are now, officially,
2000] 321
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
civilized. International law publicists traditionally thought of
the "civilized practice" of European states as international
law, and maintained that European customs pertaining to
international relations were stable and universal enough to
be considered a source of law. This was no doubt a prejudice,
particularly considering the prevalence of violence in Europe,
and while in some quarters the prejudice may have fueled
imperialism, among publicists it was primarily an analytic
error. Today, states from around the globe participate in
international organizations, pay their dues to the United
Nations, repay the loans organized under the auspices of the
International Monetary Fund or other supranational organ,
and generally act as if they were one of the traditional
arbiters of international law. Although differences of opinion
and interest continue to exist between North and South,
between developed and developing nations, these differences
are discussed in the terms of public international law.
Because international law has largely fulfilled its aspiration
to become the law for all nations, because barbarism is
relatively isolated, the new distinction between a participant
in the global order and a nation which sets itself outside that
order, between civilized and barbarian, is more salient than it
has ever been before.
The second reason for the contemporary authority of the
bifurcation between civilized and barbarian is that current
notions of security and international relations have made the
bifurcation a political imperative. If the old distinction
between civilized and barbarian was a prejudice, the new
bifurcation is a creed. Contemporary progress and culture
theories of international relations present civilization-stable
liberal modernity-as either the inevitable and desired
outcome of history, or as the only hope for an irredeemably
conflicted world. Strategic thinking transforms these
analyses of, and general political prescriptions for,
international relations into a security requirement. In a
world defined in terms of dangers rather than enemies, the
destabilizing potential of anarchic territories or illiberal
states renders them a threat to the civilized world of liberal
modernity. It is necessary for the safety of all that we ensure
the liberal modernity of all.
Consequently, the United Nations Security Council voted
for military measures to ensure that Iraq is obedient, and
intervention in Somalia or Bosnia, or in Haiti or East Timor
is not seriously viewed as military aggrandizement. Instead,
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these actions are the expressions of the civilized world toward
the barbarian world, the public interest of the police in
keeping the peace. Joseph Nye recently argued that the
course of events, particularly U.S. commitments, elevated
Kosovo from the "C" list of countries (for which U.S. policy is
defined by humanitarian sentiments) to the "B" list (for
which U.S. policy is defined by direct threats to U.S.
interests).21 Perhaps a drawn-out war, in which the credibility
of the U.S. military and NATO, and hence possibly
widespread destabilization, was at stake, would have
elevated tiny Kosovo to the "A" list of countries, for which
U.S. policy is defined by threats to the survival of the U.S.-
countries like the old Soviet Union, or perhaps that domino,
Vietnam. From within the logic of civilized and barbarian, it
can always be argued that barbarism is destabilizing, and
once barbarism has been engaged, the need to preserve
credibility requires that it be defeated.
By using cruise missiles to engender compliance with
United Nations resolutions-not to compel compliance, which
would have required a ground invasion-the Coalition
introduced the idea of the military sanction into international
law. Military sanctions, like acts of war, are violent. But
military sanctions and war are also different from one
another. War is a means of coercion, an exercise of force.
Military sanctions, like economic sanctions and even normal
diplomatic maneuvering, are a means of negotiation, not a
replacement for negotiation like war, even war legitimated by
Security Council resolution. Military sanctions rely on the
assent of the party to whom they are addressed, in contrast
to military victory, which obviates the need for assent. Thus,
incredibly enough, military sanctions are a means of creating
community.
In using military sanctions, the Coalition fulfilled the
promise of San Francisco and Nuremberg and finally joined
what had theretofore been held asunder, international law
and publicly organized violence. International law has
blessed the use of force; the law now includes, as opposed to
excuses, violence. Under what circumstances will such
blessings be granted?
21. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Redefining the National Interest, FOREIGN AFF.,




In many places, the Cold War established local peace by
asserting global conflict. The end of the global conflict was
also the beginning of many local wars. People no longer had
geopolitical reasons for not killing each other, nor were they
prevented from killing each other by foreign intervention
(usually effected through propping up an absolutist regime
favorable to one's policies, for example as the United States
did, in countries such as Liberia, Somalia, and Zaire, or as
the Soviet Union did in countries such as Afghanistan and
Ethiopia). For much of the planet, global politics suddenly
ceased to matter, and the superpowers not only stopped
opposing one another on the soil of third parties, they often
decamped altogether, leaving the locals to conduct their own
affairs. All too often, local politics degenerated into violence;
war broke out in each of the countries just mentioned. The
end of the Cold War meant that local political interests could
be expressed violently, as they have been throughout most of
history.
The nineteenth century Prussian military strategist
Clausewitz said that war is politics by other means, and our
time has been wryly called a "return to Clausewitz."22
Characterizing contemporary affairs as a "return to
Clausewitz" makes an important point. In Clausewitz's
Europe, many parties played politics, even the violent politics
of war. During the Cold War, only the East and the West
pursued politics that mattered. Other wars may have been of
great local importance, but they were treated as proxy fights,
skirmishes between East and West, usually marshaled by the
Soviet Union or China on the one side, the United States on
the other.' Now, as in Clausewitz's day, even miniscule
22. Willem F. Van Eekelen, Secretary General of the Western European
Union, Keynote Address for the Conference "The International System after the
Collapse of the East-West Order," Institute for European and International
Studies, Luxembourg, Feb. 1, 1993 (personal notes on file with author).
23. It bears mentioning that the United States often understood the world
as even more polarized than it was. There was even a minority-I'm tempted to
say dissident-policy tradition, that resisted the habits of thought dominant in
American policy circles. In the early 1960s, George Kennan famously argued
that the Soviet Union remained, in profound ways, Russia--"a creature of its
history. As David Halberstam put it, throughout the Cold War it might have
been possible for the United States to see "the tensions of the world in
traditional terms of nationalism, and not to see communism as a monolith."
David Halberstam, Requiem for the Cold War, PLAYBOY, Jan. 1, 1994, at 161,
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places like Serbia can dream belligerent dreams.
Yet despite the decentralization of warfare, Clausewitz
departed rather than returned at the end of the Cold War.
The world has been decisively recharacterized by the
contemporary bifurcation between civilized and barbarian. As
result, the conceptual vocabulary of international relations
has been transformed. Clausewitz and his heirs understood
international politics as a particular structure of relations
among civilized nations. Elements of the matrix were
described with the vocabulary of national interests, law,
diplomacy, or war. Because those concepts have been
redefined, the structure articulated by Clausewitz no longer
exists.
From the realist perspective, understanding national
interests was the key to understanding international affairs.
A nation's "interests are eternal and perpetual," said another
patron of realism, British Foreign Minister Lord
Palmerston.24 National interests could be expressed in a
variety of ways. The most obvious way for a nation to express
its interests was directly, through diplomacy. Another
expression of national interest was the creation of
international law, through which nations made the
relationships among themselves binding. Yet another way for
nations to express their interests was to go to war. (Realists
often called interests for which a nation goes to war vital
interests, i.e., interests worthy of killing.)
After a lengthy consideration of the "incompatibility
between war and every other human interest," and the
resultant impossible exigencies imposed on humans at war,
Clausewitz wrote that war was conceptually unified (and
hence could be the object of a science in the German sense of
Wissenschaft) by "the concept that war is only a branch of
220. And in the 1970s, after the monolithic view of Communism had led the
United States into Vietnam, the policies of the Nixon and Ford Administrations
toward both China and Russia relied, at least to some extent, on a triangular,
as opposed to polar, political geometry. But these are roads that were barely
traveled; this Essay is in part an effort to map the highway.
24. Lord Palmerston, in defending his foreign policy in the House of
Commons, remarked, "We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual
enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our
duty to follow." 97 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) 122 (1848), quoted in RESPECTFULLY
QUOTED: A DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS REQUESTED FROM THE CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE 10 (Suzy Platt ed., 1989). The thought was famously
repeated by Charles DeGaulle: "A state worthy of the name has no friends-only
interests." NEWSWEEK, Oct. 1, 1962.
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political activity; that it is in no sense autonomous."25 For
Clausewitz, war was to be understood as a language, one way
in which the nation expressed itself.
War in itself does not suspend political intercourse or change it
into something entirely different. In essentials that intercourse
continues, irrespective of the means it employs. The main lines
along which military events progress, and to which they are
restricted, are political lines that continue throughout the war into
the subsequent peace. How could it be otherwise? Do political
relations between peoples and between their governments stop
when diplomatic notes are no longer exchanged? Is war not just
another expression of their thoughts, another form of speech or
writing? Its grammar, indeed, may be its own, but not its logic.26
In the same vein, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara
described bombs dropped on North Vietnam as "bomb-o-
grams."2 '7 The primary purpose of U.S. ordnance is to express
the national interests of the United States; the fact that
explosives kill people is secondary, if not exactly incidental, to
the realization of those interests.
Thus, from a realist perspective, law, diplomacy, and
warfare might be viewed as three different languages in
which international politics could be conducted. The same
action, for example stationing an aircraft carrier in
international waters off the coast of another nation, might
have made statements in all three languages, statements
which were both unified by a single political intention and yet
distinguishable. Legally, stationing a carrier was permitted,
and did not change the prior legal relations of the parties.
Diplomatically, stationing a carrier usually showed
displeasure, and militarily, it might have conferred an
advantage. Although related, law, diplomacy, and war were
obviously distinct languages-the political message of the
same action was somewhat different in each language. As
with literature, so with politics: translation entailed shifts in
meaning.
The metaphor of language-and with it, the idea that
law, diplomacy, and war are all expressions of national
interest-always had its limitations. These political languages
25. CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 605 (Michael Howard & Peter Paret,
trans., 2d ed. 1989) (1832).
26. Id (emphasis added).
27. See LEWIS H. LAPHAM, WAITING FOR THE BARBARIANS 29-30 (1997).
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never had independently determinable meanings.
Consideration of one political language required knowledge of
the other: law addressed the parameters of war, diplomacy
mediated between law and war, and war changed legal
relationships. Nor did the three languages mentioned here
comprise an exhaustive list. But while the precise contours of
the relationships among law, diplomacy, and warfare were
both complex and fluid, at a fundamental level each language
was a way of expressing, and hopefully of attaining, national
interests. From the perspective of realist theories, the
languages were functionally equivalent, and the
establishment of national interests was logically prior to each
of them.
This equivalence and this order of priority no longer
exist, which is why I suggested that Clausewitz has departed.
Although one still hears the language of the realists (new
languages take a while to develop), the contemporary
understanding of international politics is vitally different
from that of Clausewitz and his realist heirs. The broad
outlines of the contemporary reimagination of international
law are already becoming familiar: Within the global order,
civilization, law is prior to politics. Politics is no longer
imagined as the barely fettered pursuit of national interest in
the wilderness of international affairs. Contemporary
international politics is the orderly pursuit of interests (many
defined along non-national lines) within the framework of
international civil society, a framework now formed by a web
of trans-, multi-, and supranational understandings. This
web of understanding forms a legal environment-what my
teacher Harold Berman calls world law-in which political
and economic activity are embedded.28 We now consider the
politics of nations (and other actors on the global stage) to be
embedded in law in much if not exactly the same way that we
consider domestic activity to be situated in a legal
environment. It is true, of course, that politics is also prior to
law, because law is made through political processes, i.e.,
political outcomes alter the environment for subsequent
politics. The vital change in our conception of international
relations, however, is that we no longer think of international
law as an expression of national politics so much as a
28. Harold J. Berman, Essay, The Role of International Law in the Twenty-
First Century, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1617 (1995).
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precondition for political action within the civilized order. 9
Kosovo has made this shift in the way international law
is conceived, implicit in the emergence of the global market,
explicit for the heart of traditional public international law,
state sovereignty. The broad acceptance among international
law scholars of the NATO intervention in Yugoslavia on
behalf of the Kosovar Albanians strongly suggests that the
nation-state is no longer believed to be the fundamental unit
of international law. Yugoslavian (Serbian) activity in its
own province of Kosovo posed no immediate military threat
to another country; there was no Security Council decision
authorizing the use of force. The considered view of many
international law scholars is that the NATO bombing was,
under the Charter at least, illegal. But it apparently did not
feel illegal. I have listened to and read numerous
impassioned arguments that strained but failed to find
traditional legal justification for NATO's actions. At some
fundamental level, international law scholars appear to have
subordinated the doctrine of state sovereignty to
international law's prohibition on genocide, a position which
has been explicitly taken by Michael Glennon: "[I]ntrastate
genocide is no longer entitled to the protection of
sovereignty."3'
Kosovo appears to teach two lessons important for the
purposes of this Essay. First, genocide is barbarism, and the
civilized world need not respect the sovereignty of
barbarians, even when they pose no threat to security.
Warfare against barbarians is permissible; even Germany,
with understandable hesitation, supported the NATO
intervention in Kosovo." Warfare may even, pace Glennon, be
29. This is a point emphasized by another of my teachers, Abram Chayes.
See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995).
30. My sense of the scholarly communities is that most American scholars
supported the intervention, with varying degrees of discomfort and varying
judgments regarding its conformity with international law. I know some
Europeans opposed the intervention, and it seems to me that European
international law scholars on the whole were more hesitant about the wisdom of
the intervention, and on the whole more convinced of, and more concerned
about, its illegality.
31. Michael Glennon, Glennon Replies, FOREIGN AFF., July/August 1999, at
120, 122. Glennon is replying to eminent critics Thomas Franck and Edward
Luck, who take issue with Glennon's article The New Interventionism: The
Search for a Just International Law, FOREIGN AFF., May/June 1999, at 2.
32. See Niall Ferguson, Mitteleuropa Diarist: Parallels, THE NEW REPUBLIC
328 [Vol. 48
LAW THROUGH WAR
required-hence the "new interventionism."3 If barbarian (at
least genocidal) states are not sovereign, they cease to be
states.
The second lesson is the converse of the first: statehood is
defined in terms of participation in the civilized order.
Whereas international law was once understood to be the
product of express or tacit agreement among states, the state
itself has come to be defined by its conformity to the basic
requirements of international law. Failure to conform to such
requirements, for example, by slaughtering one's minorities,
results in the forfeiture of sovereignty and so loss of
statehood. Writing about Yugoslavia in a play premiered this
summer in Vienna and in Belgrade (while NATO bombarded
the city), Peter Handke captured the new international
perspective perfectly: "Third International Representative:
'This is not a people, just a mere entity. This is no country,
just a gray zone. And gray zones can no longer be tolerated
geopolitically."34 Thus substantive international law is prior
to national politics.
Within the civilized order, politics can be expressed in a
variety of ways, but by definition, warfare is not an
expression of orderly politics. The United States is not about
to go to war with the European Union over bananas, nor is
Japan mobilizing its armed forces in order to sell more light
trucks. Trade wars are just that: highly legalistic disputes
over the regulation of transfers within the global market. The
disputes themselves presume the existence not only of the
market, but of various international fora, the press, the
World Trade Organization (WTO), the United Nations, and
various governmental channels, in which to hold the dispute.
Within these fora, modes of expression range from the legal
June 7, 1999, at 50.
33. Glennon, supra note 31; see also THE NEW INTERVENTIONISM 1991-1994:
UNITED NATIONS EXPERIENCE IN CAMBODIA, FORMER YUGOSLAVIA AND SOMALIA
(James Mayall ed., 1996); Stephen John Stedman, The New Interventionists,
FOREIGNAFF., 1993, at 1.
34. PETER HANDKE, DIE FAHRT IM EINBAUM, ODER, DAS STUECK ZUM FILM VOM
KRIEG [TRAVELLING BY DUGOUT, or THE PLAY ABOUT THE FILM ABOUT THE WAR]
93 (1999) (author's translation). To put it mildly, Handke is ill at ease with the
passage quoted: "Dritter Internationaler: Das ist kein Volk, sondern eine blosse
Entitaet. Das ist kein Land, sondern eine Grauzone. Und Grauzone koennen
geopolitisch nicht mehr geduldet werden." Translating Handke's text into
English presents fine challenges. I thank my parents, who saw this play at its
premiere in Vienna, for their thoughts on Handke in general, and on the
translation of the title and the passage at note 54 infra in particular.
20001 329
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
(e.g., adjudication) to the traditionally diplomatic (e.g., WTO
negotiation) to the baldly political (e.g., use of the press).
Security is now defined in terms of keeping those channels
healthy, not as it once was, as military advantage that can be
used in the event of the failure of those channels.
The current imagination of international relations is
circular (as was the imagination of Clausewitz and his realist
heirs), and warfare is simply out of the circle. We have
undergone a change analogous to the change from polis to
empire: While perhaps the essence of political life is the same
as it was during the Cold War, just as the essence of political
life perhaps was unchanged by Alexander, the ways in which
we can think about politics have shifted. Traditional realism
is no longer available to us. The elements of Clausewitz's
scheme of national interests, expressed through law,
diplomacy, and war, have been rearranged. Within the
civilized order, international law is the precondition for the
expression of national interest. It is true that national
interest generates international legislation, as well as
diplomacy and other forms of ordinary political expression,
such as the manipulation of the press, that is, nations still
make law. But national interest does not determine political
expression, is not some sort of "ground" on which
international law or diplomacy is founded. The "national
interest" has become a vague yet pervasive construct which
suffuses but does not determine the progress of actual affairs.
For example, no one would maintain that the cabaret of our
trade policy is a consistent expression of some national
interest. The national interest is largely unknown, and serves
more often as a trope than as the lodestar of trade
negotiation.
Politics within the civilized order cannot be militarized,
because the civilized order is defined as the area within
which politics is not carried forth by military means.
Similarly, on the national plane, the civil order is largely
defined as an area where the state, but not the individual,
enjoys the use of force. When an individual uses force against
another, he has to some extent left the civil order; when a
state uses force against another, it too has left the civilized
order. This does not mean that nations cannot, or do not, use
force. But once a state has entered violent relations, at least
some civilized relations have been abandoned.
The barbarian world, in contrast, is the world in which
violence belongs, the world of warfare. There are two types of
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warfare: the warfare in Nigeria, Sudan, and Columbia-the
places where locals slaughter one another, where barbarism
threatens. (Perhaps the argument is heard that external
military forces should intervene, that the world should do
something in order to ameliorate the suffering.) The second
type of warfare has recently been found in Iraq, Somalia,
Rwanda, Kosovo, and East Timor, places where the civilized
world intervenes in a local conflict and expresses itself
through force, slaughters locals. The now pressing question is
how the civilized world will make its violence principled.
C. Legalizing War
Enunciating or expressing a principled conception of law
through war, and by implication the relationship between
civilization and barbarism, will be difficult for the "civilized"
world to accomplish for two reasons. First and morally, it
requires setting almost at nought one of the values that we
pride ourselves on, tolerance, and admitting that we have,
and are acting on, a profound prejudice, the distinction
between civilized and barbarian.
The second problem is more subtle. On the one hand,
warfare requires expedience. But states that merely do what
is expedient will not be regarded as obeying law; a law
through war that merely enjoins states to do what they
otherwise would will not be recognized as law. Indeed,
international law regarding the use of force has always been
vulnerable to the exigencies of military conflict. Violations of
the law in the name of military necessity predictably lead to
the charge that the purported law is merely an apology for
power. It therefore may seem more prudent, and more
realistic, to leave decisions regarding the use of force up to
the political elements of the international community, and to
structure military intervention around ad hoc assessments of
individual cases.
Although the civilized world has reasons to avoid
articulating a law through war, the ad hoc approach is
unlikely for at least seven reasons. First, military operations
carried out under more than one political authority require
public specification, rules, as to how they will be carried out.
If military action is carried out under the auspices of the
United Nations, for example as in Iraq, by troops recruited
and organized by individual states, the various authorities
involved need to specify their activities in order to avoid
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conflict among themselves. Specification is not the same
thing as law, because specification can be restricted to a
particular situation, for example, Iraq. Nonetheless,
specification does introduce the idea that military action is
subjected to a rule, even if it is a rule that applies only to an
individual case.
Second, there are no individual cases. Situations are only
isolated as a matter of analysis. Practice generates rules;
custom arises. That which was authorized or denominated
illegitimate once is likely to be so again. Does the declaration
of a no-fly zone include passenger planes? Suppose the planes
could be carrying troops? Any answer creates a precedent,
begins a custom, and custom is the legislation of history.
Custom will provide authoritative answers to such questions
if written legislation does not. Unlike the coordination of
individual political entities, this legislation by custom will be
general.
Third, rules are endemic to large bureaucracies. The
wars of the civilized world, like much of their politics, are a
matter of bureaucratic articulation. Bureaucracy, i.e.
"rational" entities that rely on a professional claim to truth
for their authority, prefer their particular actions to be
understood as instantiations of rules. (Bureaucratic action
that does not appear to be dictated by rules undermines the
authority of the bureaucracy.) Rules come to the fore when
bureaucratic authority is challenged, usually when
bureaucracies conflict." Such conflicts are jurisgenerative:
international institutions, like states acting in concert, will
attempt to establish clear lines of competence in order to
avoid hindering one another's work, and undermining one
another's authority.
Fourth, the United States is unlikely to use force without
securing the approval of other important states. Although it
is unclear whether the United States would have gone to war
in the Persian Gulf even without United Nations approval, it
certainly sought that approval. Similarly, NATO, not exactly
the United States, intervened on behalf of the Kosovar
35. "If we don't learn anything else out of this operation, we need to learn
never to set up another situation like dual key. We have got two separate
command organizations working for two different political bodies . . . ." U.S.
Navy Admiral Leighton W. Smith Jr., commander- in-chief of Allied Forces in
Southern Europe, quoted in Peter Benesh, NATO Chief Faults U.N. Bosnia
Bind Admiral Says 'Dual Key' Command Setup Prevents Air Drops of Food to
Needy, PITrSBURGH POST-GAzETTE, Apr. 22, 1995, at A4.
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Albanians. If one is fighting under the banner of civilization
rather than mere national interest, it should be possible to
secure international support, or at least explicit acquiescence,
for the effort. So the institutional structure of our recent
interventions has been international rather than national.
Fifth, the civilized world is unable to intervene
everywhere. The sheer scope of contemporary anarchy can
lead to conflicts among peoples who, incredibly enough, want
to be invaded by a superior power, for example, certain ex-
Yugoslavians, Somalis, and Haitians. Such peoples need a
principled way to plead their case, and more generally, to
resolve their conflicts over that precious resource, the
violence required to establish order. In consequence, some
principled way of deciding among claimants for intervention
is required. Any politically operative articulation of those
principles will be international law.
Sixth, from the converse perspective of the civilized
world, there needs to be a principled way to decide where to
intervene, to sort out the complexities of moral obligation,
efficacy, interest, and so forth, so that we feel justified in
establishing order in a certain area, and abandoning another
area to its destiny unaided, so that we are relatively
comfortable in choosing, for example, between intervening in
Somalia and Yemen, or between Yugoslavia and Rwanda.
Failure to have a principled way to make such decisions
leaves the civilized world open to charges of callousness if it
does little or nothing, or prejudice (racism) if it acts in one
place but not another.
Seventh and finally, the civilized world must base its
military interventions on legal principle because failure to do
so would leave its military representatives vulnerable to
lawsuit in its own courts. For example, as of this writing,
various NATO member states have been charged, before the
International Court of Justice, with violating Yugoslavia's
sovereignty and hence international law. It will not be
surprising if other suits are filed against NATO forces
alleging that actions taken in Yugoslavia violated the
international law prohibiting war crimes. More generally, a
growing number of international tribunals and an increasing
willingness on the part of municipal courts to impose
international law (consider the courts of both Spain and
Great Britain in the Pinochet matter) ensure that even the
violence of civilized sovereigns against barbarians (or, in the
Pinochet matter, of a sovereign against its own subjects) will
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be evaluated, after the fact, in legal terms. In order that they
not subsequently be deemed illegal, the civilized world's
military interventions are now required to be defensible in
the legal terms the civilized world has articulated in order to
judge barbaric action. To summarize: the civilized world's
military interventions will be legally articulated because the
law through war is constitutional, a way through which the
civilized world sets bounds to its own power.
In this Essay I have discussed a core prejudice in
contemporary views of international law, the distinction
between civilized and barbarian. The civilized world may
impose law on barbarism: by launching cruise missiles to
encourage compliance with international resolutions; by
disregarding the sovereignty of a barbaric regime and
bombing its cities; by trying individual barbarians for their
atrocities. Such impositions are legalistically articulated; we
are legislating through war. I would like to finish by asking
what thinking about a law through war might entail.
IV. CIVILIZING VIOLENCE
The end of the Cold War engendered a rare level of
consensus-or, more precisely, a relative lack of
disagreement-over American foreign policy. "Right and
left[,]" Stephen Stedman claimed in Foreign Affairs in 1992,
"agree on the broad outlines of America's future foreign
policy,"3 6 and that agreement forms the basis for what
Stedman termed the new interventionism, the willingness to
deploy the military that occasions this Essay. But, as I said
at the beginning of this Essay, the substance of any such
agreement on policy-what we might term the Washington
consensus-is based upon largely tacit understandings of
politics. It would be unreasonable to expect tacit
understandings, and hence the Washington consensus, to be
very thoughtful. So, before further elaborating the new
interventionism, i.e., before articulating a law through war,
we should examine the substance and assumptions of this
putative policy consensus with some care.
The new consensus---"the lack of vehement disagreement
in print, much less violent protest or illegal action, over going
to war-is striking. Why does the "liberal" newspaper of
36. Stephen J. Stedman, The New Interventionists: Civil Wars and Human
Rights, FOREIGNAFF., Special Issue 1992/93, at 1.
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record, the New York Times, join the conservative
"newspaper" the Economist in proselytizing for massive
intervention in unhappy countries, chiefly Yugoslavia? Why
has American force-deployed in Somalia, in the Persian Gulf,
in Haiti, in Yugoslavia-raised so few questions? Where have
the critics of United States policy, which more out of
convenience than in precision I will call "the left," gone? Jane
Fonda did not visit Baghdad, and did not even stop to offer
aid and comfort in Port au Prince on her way to the United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio
de Janeiro. Whatever happened to the hordes of people who,
during and after the Vietnam War, said that America has no
moral authority to police the world? One still hears the
phrase on occasion, but nowadays it usually indicates the
speaker's belief that we should spend our money on domestic
problems and let other folks tend to their own difficulties.
I recently took part in a conference honoring Abram
Chayes," who, as Legal Adviser in the State Department,
authored the U.S. Government's somewhat tenuous defense
of the legality of the naval blockade of Cuba during the
Cuban missile crisis in 1962.8 Abe has also been willing to
criticize the United States: he represented Nicaragua in its
successful suit against the United States before the
International Court of Justice in the Hague." At present, the
United States and its allies seem to be without a well-
articulated legal defense for the decision to bomb Yugoslavia,
and yet the bombing itself seemed beyond defense and
reproach. At the conference, generations of liberal
internationalists were unconvinced that a plausible case for
the legality of the NATO intervention for Kosovo could be
made-and still supported the intervention. Evidently, we do
have the moral, if not (yet) the legal, authority to police the
world. But one cannot help asking, where is the criticism?
Are today's wars so clearly right, while those of a generation
ago were so clearly wrong?
37. Harvard Law School, International Law Plus or Minus Fifty Years: A
Colloquium on the Occasion of Abram Chayes' Fiftieth Law School Reunion
(Apr. 23-24, 1999) (visited Feb. 26, 2000) <http://www.law.harvard.edu/
Admissions/GraduatePrograms/chayes>.
38. See ABRAM CHAYES, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS: INTERNATIONAL CRISES
AND THE ROLE OF LAW (1974), especially Appendix III, "Department of State
Memorandum: Legal Basis for the Quarantine of Cuba."
39. See Abram Chayes, Nicaragua, the United States, and the World Court,
85 COLUM. L. REv. 1445 (1985).
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The obvious answer to these questions is that since the
Vietnam War was lost, the Cold War was won-a point even
the Vietnamese seem eager to concede. The collapse of the
Marxist states was more than the predicate for the end of the
Cold War and the East-West order. Political collapse marked
a profound loss of faith in the possibility that the details of
social life could be consciously organized, for example, that
the flow of goods and services could be managed by rational
planning. But if social life cannot be consciously organized, if
government is a failure, then rational criticism of social
arrangements is a waste of time. Politics remains a necessity,
but serious political critique is hopeless and can be avoided.
This skepticism should give Americans pause. It was the
United States, not the Soviet Union, that first posed the
question "whether societies of men are really capable or not of
establishing good government from reflection and choice, or
whether they are forever destined to depend for their political
constitutions on accident and force."0 For all the elegance of
the Constitutional frame, who could watch the antics of any
recent election and think we Americans have affirmed
Hamilton's first possibility, that is, who is willing to claim
that we have a reflective politics? Apparently not the
participants: President Clinton opened his first inaugural
address as "a celebration of the mystery of American
renewal," and spoke not of governance ordered and fruitful
like nature, but in imagery evocative of both Caesar's birth
and rape, of "forcing the spring."1 For Americans, the world
of politics has become obdurate, unyielding, and in the failure
of our minds, we rely on the will, force. Perhaps the American
dream of a rational politics, what we with characteristic
aspiration used to call the American experiment, is over.
This poses a puzzle. If we so doubt that our peaceful
relations are rational, should we not be that much more
unwilling to engage in warfare? Vaclav Havel's argument
against political violence should ring true for us. Havel
argued that, in claiming that he and other dissidents were
plotting the violent overthrow of the state, the authorities
badly misunderstood the dissidents' critique of Marxist
politics. For the dissidents, a violent revolutionary was one
40. THE FEDERALIST No. 1, at 33 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (1787) (emphasis added).
41. We Force the Spring: Transcript of [Inaugural] Address by President
Clinton, N.Y. TIMES , Jan. 21, 1993, at A15 (emphasis added).
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who was willing to kill people for the sake of a theoretically
possible political imagination, who was willing to trade
certain death for dubious ideas-a fool. The dissidents were
rebelling against just such tyranny of theory, against a
politics that subjugated humanity, in all its messy reality, to
the constraints of doctrine. In their world, where no one
believed in political certainty, there could be no
revolutionaries. For them, the only sensible politics was non-
violent politics.4 2 Why does this conclusion, which sounds so
sensible when applied to authoritarian states and sectarian
violence within the developing world, not seem to apply to the
United States and other civilized countries in their activities
towards at least parts of the developing world?
During the Vietnam War, the American woman of letters
Mary McCarthy struggled with the relationship between
conscientious politics and military engagement in a review
she wrote of Alexander Solzhenitsyn's August 1914."3
42. The anitpathy of Havel and like-minded dissidents is to be found
in the innermost structure of the 'dissident' attitude. This attitude is
and must be fundamentally hostile towards the notion of violent
change - simply because it places its faith in violence. (Generally, the
'dissident' attitude can only accept violence as a necessary evil in
extreme situations, when direct violence can only be met by violence
and where remaining passive would in effect mean supporting violence:
let us recall, for example, that the blindness of European pacifism was
one of the factors that prepared the ground for World War I) As I
have already mentioned, 'dissidents' tend to be skeptical about political
thought based on the faith that profound social changes can only be
achieved by bringing about (regardless of the method) changes in the
system or in the government, and the belief that such changes-because
they are considered 'fundamental'-justify the sacrifice of 'less
fundamental' things, in other words, human lives. Respect for a
theoretical concept here outweighs respect for human life. Yet this is
precisely what threatens to enslave humanity all over again.
'Dissident movements,' as I have tried to indicate, share exactly the
opposite view. They understand systemic change as something
superficial, something secondary, something that in itself can
guarantee nothing. Thus an attitude that turns away from abstract
political visions of the future toward concrete human beings and ways
of defending them effectively in the here and now is quite naturally
accompanied by an intensified antipathy to all forms of violence carried
out in the name of a 'better future,' and by a profound belief that a
future secured by violence might actually be worse than what exists
now; in other words, the future would be fatally stigmatized by the
very means used to secure it.
VACLAV HAVEL, LIVING IN TRUTH 92-93 (Jan Vladilslav trans., 1987).
43. Mary McCarthy, The Tolstoy Connection, reprinted in OCCASIONAL PROSE
155 (1985).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Solzhenitsyn's critique (which presaged Havel's) extended
beyond the particular policies of the Soviet Union to condemn
the epistemological assumptions of revolutionary politics per
se, in particular the revolutionary's claim that political
understanding sufficient to make violence an instrument is
available, at least to the intellectual vanguard.44 For
Solzhenitsyn, little of politics is understood, especially at the
time, and the obligation to fight depends on loyalty, not
politics. In short, for Solzhenitsyn, one might very well have
to be a good soldier in a bad cause, such as the First World
War. As an aging radical, McCarthy wished to protect the
theoretical legitimacy of revolutionary violence against the
arguments of dissidents like Solzhenitsyn and Havel,
arguments that, if taken seriously, would (and did) dismantle
the leftist belief in violent political rebirth. The American left
needed a casuistry of violence, a shorthand way of criticizing
events like the Vietnam War while rationalizing events like
the civil war in Nicaragua.
McCarthy considered wars against oppression, whether
by an invader, like the Germans in Russia or the United
States in Vietnam,45 or by an oppressor class, like the Tsar
and the aristocracy in Russia, to be legitimate.46 Such wars,
she seems to have hoped, would contribute to the
achievement of true human liberty." Other wars, wars that
advanced political self-interest (other than the self-interest in
liberty), were illegitimate. Vietnam, for example, was wrong
because we killed to further the self-interest of a (more or less
demonized oppressor) class, what Eisenhower called the
"military industrial complex.
'4s
44. "It is as if his book had been designed to offend 'advanced people'
wherever they are to be found-revolutionaries, real and false, all those who
wish, at least in thought, to be ahead of their time rather than behind it or in
the middle of it."Id. at 161.
45. See id. at 159.
46. It is worth noting that McCarthy opposed U.S. entry into World War II,
a position she recanted. See id. at 160.
47. Mary McCarthy explains:
[Solzhenitsyn] is urging us to turn away from the terrible encircling
trap of revolutionary ideology and take the safer course of gradualism
and inch-by-inch social progress. Yet to trust in progress today, when
no cure for the body politic but surgery is visible, seems old-fashioned,
almost simple-minded. It would take a Rip Van Winkle still to hope for
gradual betterment through reforms.
Id. at 160-61.
48. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Farewell Radio and Television Address to the
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The American left thus defended itself from the challenge
posed by the dissidents in the terms it best understood, the
terms of realism, in which warfare was a language for the
achievement of political interests-diplomacy by other means-
and moral judgment turned on one's assessment of the
political interests for which war was waged. McCarthy's
realism differed from that of Henry Kissinger (she criticized
the Vietnam War; he planned it) but polemics share contexts.
With the passage of time, the bitter controversy over Vietnam
has come to reveal substantial agreement between left and
right, even between McCarthy and Kissinger, about political
life. Revolutions, wars of liberation from colonial powers, and
defenses of the motherland against invaders, were all
legitimate military actions because they contributed to
human freedom. At this level of generality, the left's
justification for violence was the same as that offered by
many on the right, who understood the American wars,
including the Revolution, the Civil War, World War I, World
War II, Korea, and Vietnam to be about freedom, indeed, as
violent episodes in the process through which freedom was
spread across the globe. Left and right differed over whether
Marxism offered freedom, that is, whether the politics of The
Party were somehow more liberating than the politics of The
Market. Left and right also differed over how they
characterized freedom: the left thought that freedom was the
expression of community; the right saw freedom as the
absence of restraint in order that one might go about one's
business in an open society. From either perspective, military
violence was legitimate because it made the construction of
the good polity, and thus human freedom, possible.
In view of the ugliness in the Soviet Union, Germany,
Cambodia, and even epiphenomena like our internment of
our citizens of Japanese descent and McCarthyism, few still
believe that violence is liberating. Violence has its own
fearsome logic, and that logic deployed for institutional
purposes is totalitarian, not liberating. Under the attack of
the dissident literary tradition, the idea that freedom for
politics will be advanced by violence has been discredited.
Where even a minimal social order exists, violence will be
useless to improve the lot of the people because of the nature
American People, Jan. 17, 1961, in OFFICE OF THE FED. REGISTER, NAT'L ARCHIVES
& REC. ADMIN., PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES:
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER 1038 (1961).
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of violence itself. Revolution has failed; gradualism has
triumphed.
Prisoners of their sort of realism, the American left could
not confront the issue raised by Solzhenitsyn, Havel, and
other dissident intellectuals, who asked a question that could
not be phrased within the grammar of realism, and that
required a new political language. If politics is largely
irrational, and violence has its own evil logic, how can we
justify political violence? By the time Clausewitz ceased to
describe our world, so had Marx, and the idea that
enlightened liberation justifies violence became absurd." But
the left had nothing else to offer, and so fell silent regarding
our military violence. That silence is the measure of the
extent to which the left's casuistry had occupied the field of
serious critique of our military policy.
The new warfare is not a matter of national interest as
traditionally understood. We had no national interest in
Somalia or Rwanda; we have no interest in what was
Yugoslavia. We had traditional but hardly vital interests in
Persian Gulf oil, and in curbing the Iraqi military build-up.
Our actions in Africa and Yugoslavia were justified primarily
on humanitarian grounds, with the obligatory nod to the
need for stability and security in the region in which the
troubled country in question is located. The Gulf War was
explicitly legitimated, and mildly ridiculed but hardly
criticized, as a defense of the new world order, that is, of
global modernity.0 No doubt criticism of our activities in the
Persian Gulf or the former Yugoslavia would have mounted if
the body count did, as happened in regard to our presence in
49. Hannah Arendt strenuously argued that Marx did not advocate political
change through violence; that violence accompanied historical transformation,
as labor pains a birth. As a political matter, and as Arendt herself realized, it
suffices to note the standard Marxist/revolutionary position. See Arendt, supra
note 8, at 124-28. At a deeper level, I doubt that a better reading of Marx would
resolve McCarthy's difficulty with Solzhenitsyn, more generally, the Lefts
difficulty with the dissidents. Ideas that are central to Marx, such as progress,
history, and freedom, have been powerfully transformed, even among those
who, like Havel, care a great deal about solidarity.
50. It bears remembering that any of these actions could be understood in
terms of national interest, if such interest includes that amorphous quality
known as prestige. Thus, in the logic of the Cold War, and especially Vietnam, a
government's commitment generates a national interest, i.e., the interest in
being perceived as following through on one's commitments. In short, from the
perspective of a sufficiently thorough realism, all government actions could be
justified as in the national interests, and political criticism is superfluous.
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Somalia, but the point important for our politics is that the
criticism that recently seemed so obvious-that the United
States did not have the moral authority to wage war-was
hardly made with regard to the Persian Gulf or Yugoslavia
(at least in this country). Nor did we hear the dissident
criticism, the skeptical belief that government is unlikely to
do anything right, and should consequently avoid, whenever
possible, killing people. Why not? To borrow from Conrad's
tale of civilization militant, Heart of Darkness, it is strange
how we accepted this unforeseen partnership, this choice of
nightmares forced upon us in the tenebrous land invaded by
these mean and greedy phantoms.5
We have accepted this particular nightmare because our
current ideologies, by which I mean merely our collective
mythological accounts of politics, do not make much sense of
the present situation. We are witnessing the transformation,
not the end, of ideology, but such transformations take time,
and there simply has not been enough time to come up with a
serviceable account of politics after the Cold War, to say
nothing of international politics in light of other obviously
significant developments, such as the emergence of
electronically mediated global capital markets. Without such
an account, our experience of politics is tenebrous, shadowy,
and all our partnerships are unforeseen and at present
almost inexpressible. But there is every reason to believe a
new ideology is emerging; I have argued that its outlines are
already discernible. This Essay attempts to articulate the
structure of belief that appears to be emerging, that is, I have
tried to make our rather inchoate understandings of
international affairs explicit, and so subject to criticism.
I have argued that the division between civilized and
barbarian is at the core of contemporary understandings of
international affairs, like the division between East and West
was at the core of understandings of international affairs
during the Cold War. But what, in general terms,
distinguishes barbarism from civilization? The East and the
West were distinguishable by explicit ideological
commitments. In the same vein, what do places like Somalia,
Bosnia, Cambodia, and East Timor have in common? How do
such places differ from our own lands? To ask the question is
to answer it: barbaric are those places where people have
51. JOSEPH CONRAD, HEART OF DARKNESS 137 (D.C.R.A. Goonetilleke ed.,
Broadview Press 1995) (1902).
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vested identities in groups that can be militarily mobilized,
and where such people have not only been mobilized, they
have been deployed, and are killing.
The ability to identify violently is a traditional idea of
politics, the ability to distinguish friend from foe, the citizen
of the polis with whom one fights from the foreigner (in
Greek the barbarian) against whom one fights. Unlike the
identity of the citizen or of the barbarian, the modern identity
is fractured. With whom do we identify? Against whom would
we fight? Members of another race? Social class? Religion?
Gender? Any locus of identity possible for the true modem
would result in heart-ripping conflicts if it were to be
militarily mobilized. Civil war is not only the occasion for the
construction of the modem order, the preoccupation of
Hobbes,52 it is also the nemesis of the modern condition.
In consequence and defense, we moderns understand the
outbreak of violence as a lapse, a return to an earlier stage in
history. The conflict in Yugoslavia has continually been
referred to as an anachronism, as somehow not part of
modern Europe.53 As Yugoslavia dissolved-in the time
52. See, e.g., THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 223 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1968)
(1651):
The final cause, end, or design of men (who naturally love liberty, and
dominion over others) in the introduction of that restraint upon
themselves (in which we see them live in commonwealths) is the
foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented life
thereby; that is to say, of getting themselves out from that miserable
condition of War, which is necessarily consequent (as has been shown)
to the natural passions of men, when there is no visible power to keep
them in awe ....
Id. at 223.
Hobbes' "overriding concern was with civil war; its avoidance was for him the
main purpose of political inquiry." C.B. Macpherson, Introduction to HOBBES,
supra, at 9.
53. For example:
To the hundreds of millions who first beheld them on their television
screens that August day in 1992, the faces staring out from behind
barbed wire seemed powerfully familiar. Sunken cheeked, hollow-eyed,
their skulls shaved, their bodies wasted and frail, they did not seem
men at all but living archetypes, their faces stylized masks of tragedy.
One had thought such faces consigned to the century's horde of
images- the emaciated figures of the 1940s shuffling about in filthy
striped uniforms, the bulldozers pushing into dark ditches great
masses of lank white bodies. Yet here, a mere half century later, in
1992 ....




between two World Cup soccer championships-both
modernity and Europe, in every way but the purely
geological, receded. After World War II, Germany was
similarly referred to as an anachronism. Hannah Arendt
wrote that "the very word 'barbarism' today frequently
applied by Germans to the Hitler period, is a distortion of
reality; it is as though Jewish and non-Jewish intellectuals
had fled a country that was no longer 'refined' enough for
them.
54
From this one might think that we are willing to kill the
barbarian because he reminds us of a politics we believe, or
hope, that we have already left behind. Violence presents a
challenge not only to our physical security, but awakens our
fears about ourselves, threatens our identities. We live in fear
of an inescapable dissolution of the ties that bind, that one
day riots will begin and will not stop, and that we will find
ourselves part of the mob. So our greatest enemies are those
who practice the old politics, who distinguish black from
white, Crip from Blood, Serbian from Bosnian, and who give
guns to the followers inflamed with the difference. We are
willing to judge, to hate, and to kill, because deep in our
hearts, we are afraid. Again Peter Handke on the
cosmopolitan psyche:
Third International Representative: Listen! My hatred for this
country and people came about like this: Haven't we all, in our
hemisphere, long thought that a war would never again take
place, in any event, not in our world, not on our continents? War-
didn't we think it so-still existed only as a word, the thing itself
was gone from the world. The war virus died out, every yet unborn
human child immune to it. The message for war scorched entirely
from our genes. War not even the stuff of dreams. Extinct like the
dinosaurs, and, like them, now a topic almost solely for video
games. And then here in this land, that we at the time still
counted as part of our world, from one day to the next, there was55
war.
54. HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM 53 (1963).
55. HANDKE, supra note 34, at 59 (author's translation). The original
German is:
Dritter Internationaler: Hoert! Mein Hass auf Land und Voelker hier
kam folgend: Dachten wir, in unserer Hemisphaere, nich laengst alle,
es werede nie wieder ein Krieg stattfinden, jedenfalls nicht in unserer
Welt, nicht in unseren Kontinenten? Den krieg, dachten wir das nicht?
gab es nur noch also Wort, die Sache war fuer allezeit aus der Welt.
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While it has the intellectual appeal of the ugly, this
argument is too strong. If we invaded because we were afraid
of old-fashioned politics, civilized states would intervene in
more places. We seem content to let most of Africa and Asia
be quite as political (in the anachronistic sense) as they wish
to be. We also might not intervene where we have, for
example in Somalia. Moreover, how many people in the
civilized world are likely to be so taken with warrior virtues
as to imitate a Somali warlord? Obviously, some people
would: we have gangs moving drugs up the coasts who have
been known to fire randomly into crowds, and shadowy men
on the internet and in drifter hotels who seem to talk often
and bomb occasionally, and schoolchildren blowing away
their classmates. Nonetheless, most Americans would rather
enjoy themselves more peaceably. So, though I think it bears
some truth, the civilized world's fear of pre-modern politics
(the anxiety that has impelled much of this Essay) seems
insufficient to explain, much less to legitimate, our
relationship to violence.
Perhaps our relationship to the barbarian should be
viewed more simply. We take it upon ourselves to judge
barbarians just because they are barbarians. That is, the
consensus that a state is barbaric is, at the same time, license
to condemn the state. Barbarians have no standards, or what
comes to the same thing, their standards have no authority
in the civilized world. Perhaps barbarians judge us, but if so,
we do not care.
It was not always so; recent history is instructive. During
the Cold War, when East was East and West was West, the
twain shared, or at least understood, a standard with which
to judge politics. Marxism was a grand synthesis of Western
culture, and so resonated deeply in the minds of Western
intellectuals. At least in the trace form of 'qeftist tendencies,"
Marxism was nearly universal among Western academics.
Marxist critique of the inadequacy of our institutions stung.
We recognized that the Communists could, and did, judge us
in terms that we ourselves found troubling, often compelling.
Der Kriegsvirus ausgestorben, jedes noch zu gebaerende
Menschenkind gegen ihn immun. Die Botschaft "Krieg" aus
saemtlichen Genen gebrannt. Der Krieg nicht einmal Traum-Stoff.
Ausgestorben gleich den Dinosauriern, und, wie diese, ein Thema fast
nur noch fuer Videospiele. Und dann war bier im Land, dass wir




We thus felt it necessary to preempt the judgment of our
enemy by judging ourselves. The recognition of our enemy's
power to judge us occasioned our own moral inquiry.
The new barbarians have no such standard with which to
judge the West and be heard -the closest thing to such a
standard is Hussein's ranting, the mother of all jokes. We in
the civilized world assert the right to judge by default-we
are unopposed, and so, unquestioningly, shoulder what was
once called the White Man's Burden and declare ourselves
judges.56 The barbarian's lack of such a standard means that
we do not question our own actions. Our institutional
arrangements do not appear to need defending, and so we
hardly think about them.
This is wrong. As a matter of political morality, our own
actions, whatever the rightness of our opponent's cause, are
always in question. Our enemies' failure to provide us a
standard with which to judge our actions does not relieve us
of the obligation to act morally, to judge ourselves. As Ralph
Ellison put it: "Consciousness and conscience are burdens
imposed on us by the American experiment. They are the
American's agony, but when he tries to live up to their stern
demands they become his justification."" So the question
remains: what justifies our assumption that we may wage
war on the barbarians?
As discussed above, both the left and the right
traditionally justified violence when it was liberating. Left
and right disagreed about what was oppressive, what was
liberating, and so forth. Yet in spite of these substantive
differences, left and right shared a grammar for discussing
the moral legitimacy of violence: violence was justified if it
overthrew an oppressive social order. Other violence was
unjustified. But the narrative of liberation on which such
justification depends sounds implausible, as implausible as
the narrative of progress that long sustained the
Communists, but gradually became unbelievable. The same
loss of faith that marked the end of Communism-a faith in
the rational progress of human affairs-makes it difficult to
believe that a state of war is superior to virtually any social
56. See Rudyard Kipling, The White Man's Burden, in RUDYARD KIPLING'S
VERSE: INCLUSIVE EDITION, 1885-1918, at 371 (1919). Kipling's poem was
addressed to the United States, which had just acquired the Philippines, Puerto
Rico, and Cuba in the Settlement of the Spanish American War. See RALPH
DURAND, A HANDBOOK TO THE POETRY OF RuDYARD KIPLING 229 (1914).
57. RALPH ELLISON, SHADow AND ACT (1972), at xxiii.
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order.
But what if there is no social order, or the social order is
truly bestial? What about Rwanda? What about Kosovo?
There is no need to recount horrors, but horrors abounded.
May we not hope that a strong force can create order, can
force the signing of the social contract and thereby make
decent human intercourse, politics in the modern sense,
possible? Do we have an obligation to act on such hope? So
the radical leftist dream, which is also the dream of our
hawks, indeed the dream of all crusaders to create order by
the sword, has been exiled to situations where anarchy
reigns, or where tyrants mobilize hatred." The civilized
world, at its best, judges barbarians in the hope of converting
them, of creating order so that human intercourse may flow
through the channels of politics rather than down the sinews
of war. 9 All of our wars, even little adventures in oil rich
regions, must therefore be wars to end all wars, must be
justified in terms of an enlightened hope for human fruition,
must be efforts to impose law. We moderns fight wars in
order to prepare people for politics.
V. CONCLUSION
These are ugly thoughts. Most Americans do not
consciously, at least not publicly, regard other people as
barbarians, and do not want to be told that our prejudice
inclines us to kill. We are, still and all, a decent people. That
decency is, in part, the reason we consider invading distant
countries in the hope of imposing law and bringing peace, the
reason for this discussion. Americans feel that we need not
tolerate certain horrors, so we intervene.
I would be more comfortable with our interventions if we
were not so careful of our own lives, if we did not endeavor to
impose military solutions from such high altitudes. I found it
unsettling that the NATO intervention in Kosovo was
58. See Walter A. McDougall, Editor's Column, Of Crusaders Old and New,
reprinted in 43 ORBIS 345 (1999).
59. "Pecunia nervi belli" ("Money is the sinews of war.") 5 PHILIPPICS, quoted
in JAMES BucHAN, FROZEN DESIRE: THE MEANING OF MONEY 245 (1997). The
English "nerves," which once meant tendons or sinews, has gradually come to
mean a bundle of neurological fibers. In light of the emphasis placed on
information by modern practitioners of both war and finance, Cicero might be




conducted with such care while the atrocities mounted: if we
believe a situation to be so horrible that we will not abide it,
that we risk the moral danger of killing, then we should be
willing to accept a measure of physical risk as well. If we are
not willing to accept casualties, we should ask ourselves
whether we are morally serious enough to inflict them.
And I believe that sometimes we may be sufficiently
serious. Noble politics is possible, if perhaps rare. Americans
care about Africa falling, about refugees streaming up snow
covered passes, about the anguish of the world, and if we
couple such intentions with courage, we may act nobly. Sadly,
this is not enough; noble interventions may nonetheless be
wrong, fail. Remember Somalia. Mere nobility-difficult as
even that is to achieve-does not justify the acts of dominion
that the United States now regularly contemplates. Such
justification may not be beyond us, but it requires both that
we discern our weakness, including the darkness in our
hearts, and hear the pain of others, including the pain that
we may cause, before we set forth, flags flying, to do the
deeds for which we will be judged.
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